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Chapter 2: The Family is Dead, Long Live our Family / from In the Name of the Family: Rethinking Family Values in the Postmodern Age

New York: Beacon Press, 1997. pp. 38-51.

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IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY

*Rethinking Family Values
in the Postmodern Age*

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306,850973
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1996

Beacon Press
Boston

Beacon Press
25 Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108-2892

Beacon Press books
are published under the auspices of
the Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations.

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Printed in the United States of America

02 01 00 99 98 97 96 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Text design by Nancy A. Crompton

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data can be found on page 196.

An earlier version of chapter one, "Backward toward the Postmodern Family," first appeared in *America at Century's End*, Alan Wolfe, ed. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991. Chapter two, "The Family Is Dead; Long Live Our Families" revises an essay commissioned and published by Sociology Database, Craig Calhoun and George Ritzer, eds. McGraw Hill, 1994. An early version of Chapter three, "The Neo-Family-Values Campaign," first appeared in *Social Text* n. 40 (Fall 1994). Chapter four, "Virtual Social Science and the Politics of Family Values" is a revised version of a chapter originally prepared for inclusion in *Critical Anthropology in Fin-De-Siècle America: New Locations, Non-Standard Fieldwork*. George Marcus, ed. Santa Fe: School of American Research, forthcoming. Chapter five, "Gay and Lesbian Families Are Here; All Our Families Are Queer; Let's Get Used to It!" is a version of a chapter commissioned for publication in *The Evolving American Family*. Steven Sugarman, Mary Ann Mason, and Arlene Skolnick, eds. New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

CHAPTER 2

The Family Is Dead, Long Live Our Families

.

THE UNITED NATIONS PROCLAIMED 1994 TO BE "THE INTERNATIONAL Year of The Family." However, *the family* is a peculiarly Western and modern concept. Some cultures do not employ the category "family" at all. Many societies that do use the term do so to depict diverse relationships and to convey diverse meanings. By the time the United Nations chose to commemorate the family, both the term and the kinship system it has come to signify had reached a state of intense transformation and political contest, particularly in the United States, but with reverberations worldwide. By proclaiming a global year of the family, the UN imposed deceptive unity on a contested term. Its use of the term also unwittingly derives from a declining theory of modernization that has been criticized as ethnocentric.

Modernization and The Family

In most of Europe and North America the family has become nearly synonymous with the nuclear household unit made up of a married, heterosexual couple and their biological or adopted children. Al-

though popular usage more fluidly adapts the concept to refer to all people related through blood, marriage, or adoption, most Westerners do erroneously associate the family with nature and project it backward into a timeless past. However, historians have demonstrated that in the ancient world, the "Roman *familia* referred to all that which belonged to the *paterfamilias*, including slaves and servants, as well as relatives by blood or marriage."¹ Thus, the *Oxford English Dictionary* (O.E.D.) dates the first entry of the word "family" into the English language to just before the Renaissance, approximately in the year 1400, when it was used to indicate the servants of a house or household.² Historians estimate that during the fifteenth century, the vast majority of families (between two-thirds and three-fourths of all families) could not afford to rear their own children to adulthood.³

The O.E.D. places the contemporary popular meaning of family, "the group of persons consisting of the parents and their children, whether actually living together or not," as the *third* of eleven definitions it offers and places its earliest recorded usage in the late seventeenth century.⁴ Only during the nineteenth century, in the Victorian era, did our present common meaning of family come to dominance. Until the mid-nineteenth century, historian John Gillis reminds us, "it was accepted that marriage was beyond the reach of many, and that most people would not grow up in the bosom of their families of origin."⁵

It is important to recognize, therefore, that the family is a product of those long historical transformations, generally referred to as modernization. Indeed, many historians employ the concept of the modern family, to describe the particular domestic arrangements which the family has come to designate. The modern family in the West developed historically out of a patriarchal, premodern family economy in which work and family life were thoroughly integrated. In the United States, the modern family system arose in the nineteenth century when industrialization turned men into breadwinners and women into homemakers by separating paid work from households. Beginning first among white, middle-class people, this family pattern

came to represent modernity and success. Indeed the American way of life came to be so identified with this family form that the trade union movement struggled for nearly a century to secure for male workers the material condition upon which it was based—the male breadwinner wage. However, not until the mid-twentieth century did significant percentages of industrial workers achieve this access to the male breadwinner nuclear family, and it has always exceeded the reach of the vast majority of African-Americans. Slaves were not allowed to marry and had no parental rights at all, and few African-American households have ever been able to afford a full-time homemaker. In fact, many African-American mothers have worked as domestic workers in the modern-family homes of relatively privileged whites.⁶

The rise of the modern family system spelled the demise of the premodern, family economy which was explicitly patriarchal. Thus, it represented a shift in what sociologist Deniz Kandiyoti has called “patriarchal bargains.”⁷ In the classical patriarchal bargain, women accept overt subordination in exchange for protection and secure social status. The modern patriarchal bargain sugarcoats this exchange by wrapping it in an ideology of separate spheres and romantic love. In place of premodern marriages, which were arranged, in whole or in part, by parents and kin for economic, political, and social purposes, modern men and women, seeking love and companionship, voluntarily bind themselves for life to the complementary object of their individual desires. Under the guise of a separate but equal division of labor between male breadwinners and female homemakers, women and children became increasingly dependent upon the earnings of men. The nineteenth century gave rise to cults of “true womanhood,” celebrating domesticity and maternalism. This generated conceptions of femininity that continue to infuse Western family ideology.⁸ The development of analogous doctrines about the “tender years” of young children who need a specifically maternal form of love and care began to undermine earlier legal doctrines, which had treated children as patriarchal property.⁹

U.S. family patterns became more predictable and homogeneous as the modern family system evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. High mortality and remarriage rates had kept premodern family patterns diverse and complex, but declines in mortality enabled increasing numbers of people to anticipate a normal family life course. By the mid-twentieth century, modern family life patterns, from birth through courtship, marriage, work, childrearing, and death had become so homogeneous, normative, and predictable that the family began to appear natural, universal and self-evident.

Social scientists are rarely impervious to the tacit cultural understandings of their times. During the post-World War II period, family sociologists in the United States developed a theory of family modernization that was rooted in the conviction that U.S. family history would prove to be a global model. Arguing that the modern nuclear family was ideally suited to support the functioning of industrial society, and that it was both a product of and handmaiden to Enlightenment progress and democracy, social scientists predicted that it would spread throughout the modernizing world. A product of Western cultural imperialism, the family modernization thesis presumed that the superiority of Western cultural forms would insure their eventual triumph over the “backward” nations and peoples of the globe.¹⁰ Indeed some family scholars came to argue that the early development of the modern nuclear family in the West facilitated the Western supremacy in developing capitalism.¹¹

So convinced have Western governments been of the superiority of their family patterns that they have often imposed their gender and family patterns on conquered peoples. The United States, for example, disrupted matrilineal and extended kin systems among several indigenous New World cultures by awarding land titles exclusively to male-headed, nuclear household units.¹² In a similar fashion, Europeans have destructively imposed nuclear family principles on very different African kinship systems. In the Zambian copperbelt, for example, mineowners ignored and disrupted the actual extended kinship patterns of their workers by distributing benefits

only to a worker's wife and children.¹³ More often, however, Westerners presumed that the global diffusion of the modern nuclear family system would come about automatically. These rather contradictory ideas about the family—that it is natural and universal, on the one hand, and that it is a sign and agent of Western superiority, on the other—continue to collide in popular and scholarly discourse.

Contradictions of The Family

We can gain some perspective on contemporary family turmoil by recognizing contradictions inherent in the ideology, principles, and practices of the modern family system, the most glaring of which is the tension between volition and coercion. The ideology of the modern family construes marital commitment as a product of the free will and passions of two equal individuals who are drawn to each other by romantic attraction and complementary emotional needs. However, the domestic division of labor of the modern family system, which made women economically dependent upon male earners, and the subordination of women, both de jure and de facto, provided potent incentives for women to choose to enter and remain in marriages, quite apart from their individual desires. And while men certainly have always enjoyed greater opportunities to pursue their emotional and sexual interests inside and outside of marriage, until quite recently cultural codes and material sanctions led most men to depend upon the personal, emotional, and social services of a full-time homemaker. Political satirist Barbara Ehrenreich has observed that the white middle classes in the United States are likely the only bourgeoisie in history to employ members of their own class as personal servants.¹⁴

The relative acceptability of the contradiction between egalitarian principles of free love and companionship and inegalitarian forms of material and cultural coercion depended upon the availability and accessibility of a male breadwinner wage. Feminist historians have

debated the degree to which working-class wives supported, resisted, or benefitted from the trade-union struggle that men conducted to earn wages sufficient to support fulltime homemakers and mothers.¹⁵ However, no matter who achieved this arrangement, which Heidi Hartmann has called a patriarchal-capitalist bargain negotiated between male factory owners and laborers, it has proven to be quite ephemeral. The majority of industrial workers did not earn enough to support a full-time housewife until the 1950s or 1960s, and soon after they did so, deindustrialization and post-industrialization conspired to eliminate their jobs and erode their earnings.¹⁶

Thus, instability was written into the genetic code of the modern family system (on the "Y" chromosome), because its sustenance depended upon the wide availability of stable, liveable-wage jobs for men. As that strand of the bargain began to unravel during the 1970s and 1980s, the fragility of the entire gender and family order moved into full view, provoking widespread consternation over "family crisis" throughout advanced industrial societies.

During the past few decades, every developed industrial nation has experienced soaring divorce rates, falling birth rates, and rising rates of unmarried domestic partners, of step- and blended families, and of nonfamily households. Alarmists who decry family decline in the United States often overlook the transnational character of these demographic trends. A 1977 Viennese study warned that if the rate of increase in European divorce rates during the 1970s were to continue until the year 2000, at that point 85 percent of all European marriages would end in divorce.¹⁷

During this same period, the employment rates of women and men, formerly quite distinct, began to converge worldwide. Women, especially mothers of young children, now find it necessary to work for pay to support or contribute to the support of families that have been undermined by the loss of jobs and real earnings by men. The loss of steady work, or any work, for men at lower educational levels has been quite dramatic. While more than two-thirds of men with less than a high school education worked full time, year round dur-

ing the 1970s, a decade later only half could find such steady work.¹⁸ A significant wage gap between men and women persists, but the normalization of female employment and the decline in jobs for men has reduced some of women's economic dependency on men, and thus, has weakened one coercive buttress of marriage.

That is one major reason why single motherhood is rising around the globe, and why increasing percentages of single mothers have never been married. Sitcom heroine Murphy Brown has become a controversial symbol of the family circumstances of a small, but rising number of affluent, professional women in the U.S. who are choosing to become single mothers rather than to forego motherhood entirely. In reality, the vast majority of single-mother families confront dire economic circumstances.¹⁹ At the same time that many women began choosing to become mothers alone, and for related reasons, birth rates were falling below replacement levels throughout the postindustrial world. It is particularly striking that women in Italy, an overwhelmingly Catholic country, now give birth to the smallest national average number of children in the advanced industrial world.²⁰ On the other hand, birth rates have begun to rise in Sweden, despite its reputation as the leading country for family decline.²¹ The comparative level of security and confidence that prospective Swedish parents, particularly would-be mothers, derive from their nation's exceptionally progressive tax structure and social welfare provisions is the most likely explanation for this paradox. Meanwhile, the *New York Times* reports that "Eastern Germany's adults appear to have come as close to a temporary suspension of childbearing as any large population in the human experience," a response to the region's dire economic conditions since reunification. The state of Brandenburg has voted to offer parents a cash incentive of \$650 per new child born.²²

Because global capitalism is governed by the endless search for profits through increased productivity and technological development, we can be certain that our only social constant is change. Social change is a permanent and endless feature of our world, and

all we can know about the future of family life is that it too will continue to change. Recent developments in reproductive technology and genetic engineering offer glimpses of some of the most dramatic and radical implications of future family scenarios. *Junior*, a 1994 Christmas season family movie starring Arnold Schwarzenegger as a pregnant experimental scientist, (a movie which proved to be more popular with women than men), presages some of the redefinitions of family life in store as science completes its Faustian gift of separating sexuality, conception, gestation, procreation, marriage, childrearing, and parenting. Pregnant men and test-tube babies, once the standard fare of science fiction, now appear inevitable. We have already reached the point at which a man's sperm can fertilize one woman's ovum, which gestates in the uterus of a second woman, who, in turn, serves as a "surrogate" for yet a third woman, who plans to adopt and rear the offspring, with or without a second man or a fourth woman as co-parent. What and who is the mother, the father, or the family in such a world?

The Postmodern Family Condition

The astonishing transformations sketched above indicate that the particular patriarchal bargain of the modern family system has collapsed. Instead, we now forge our intimate lives within the terms of the postmodern family condition described earlier. At the current moment in Western family history, no single family pattern is statistically dominant, and our domestic arrangements have become increasingly diverse. Only a minority of U.S. households still contain married couples with children; and many of these include divorced and remarried adults. More children live with single mothers than in modern families containing a breadwinner dad and a full-time homemaker mom.²³ Most features of the postmodern family condition are most prominent in the United States and Scandinavia. But demographic trends are similar throughout the highly industrialized world, with variations only in the degree, timing, and pace of the changes,

but not in their direction. Once the family modernization thesis predicted that all the societies of the globe would converge toward a singular family system—the modern Western family system. Ironically, instead we are converging internationally toward the postmodern family condition of diversity, flux, and instability.

Under postmodern conditions, the social character of practices of gender, sexuality, parenting, and family life, which once appeared to be natural and immutable, become visible and politically charged. While similar demographic trends are dissolving the modern family system throughout the capitalist, industrialized world, national responses to the modern family crisis differ widely. Some societies have adapted to the decline of the male breadwinner family by devising generous social welfare policies that attempt to mitigate some of the destructive impact that marital fragility too often inflicts on children and the unequal burden it places on women. Again the Scandinavian countries, with Sweden and Norway in the lead, set the standards for innovative family support policies of this sort. In both nations, parents of either gender are entitled to apportion a full year's leave with 90 percent pay to take care of a newborn. Because so few fathers availed themselves of this benefit, both Sweden and Norway recently offered them added incentive to do so. Both countries now allow men, and only men, to receive an additional month of paid parental leave beyond the original twelve months, which men and women can allot as they choose. Moreover, Scandinavian workers enjoy paid leave to care for sick children and relatives, as well as universal family allowances, health care, including sex education, contraception, and abortion services, and subsidized high-quality daycare. There are few deadbeat dads in these Nordic nations, because the state assumes responsibility for collecting and distributing child care payments. As a result, while more than half of single-parent families in the United States live below the official poverty line, in Sweden only 2 percent do so.²⁴ Most likely this is why Swedish women have been willing to bear more children in recent years. Likewise, Sweden and Norway also followed Denmark's lead

in legalizing a form of marriage for same-sex couples before this became a visible political issue in the United States.²⁵

Other affluent societies, however, have proven far more hostile to postmodern demographic and cultural changes. They are far less willing to assume public responsibility for addressing the unjust and disruptive effects caused by these changes. The United States is far and away the most extreme in this regard. Reflecting an exceptionally privatized economy, an individualistic culture, and racial antagonisms, social welfare for the poor in the United States has always been comparatively stingy, punitive, and unpopular. Yet even this meager system is currently being dismantled. The United States alone, among 18 advanced industrial nations, does not provide its citizens with universal health coverage, family allowances, or paid parental leaves.²⁶ In fact, it was not until the Family Leave Act of 1993 that the right to take an unpaid three-month maternity leave, which few families can afford to use, was mandated for workers in firms with at least 50 employees. Welfare provisions in the United States have always been means-tested, stigmatized, and niggardly.²⁷ As a result, a higher percentage of single-mother families in the United States as well as a higher percentage of children in general, live in poverty than in any advanced industrial nation.²⁸ Conservative estimates of the numbers that current welfare reform legislation will add to this disturbing record have even frightened Senator Moynihan, one of the original advocates of revising the welfare system.²⁹

While family support policies in the United States are the weakest in the industrial world, no society has yet to come close to our expenditure of politicized rhetoric over family crisis. The politics of gender, sexuality, reproduction, and family here are the most polarized, militant, and socially divisive in the world, precisely because social structural responses to the decline of the modern family system have been so weak. This is an important reason why feminism, gay liberation, and backlash "profamily" movements are so vocal and influential across the political spectrum.

Rampant nostalgia for the modern family system, or more pre-

cisely, for an idealized version of a 1950s Ozzie and Harriet image of the family, has become an increasingly potent ideological force in the United States, with milder versions evident in Canada and England.³⁰ Fundamentalist Christians and right-wing Republicans spearheaded the profamily movement that abetted the Reagan "revolution" of the 1980s. By the 1994 electoral season, however, even President Clinton had embraced the ideology of an explicitly centrist campaign for family values led by a small group of social scientists. This ongoing campaign portrays family breakdown as the primary source of social malaise in the United States, blaming the decline of the married-couple family for everything from crime, violence, and declining educational standards to poverty, drug abuse, and sexually transmitted disease.³¹

There seems to be nearly an inverse relationship between a nation's rhetorical concern over the plight of children in declining families and its willingness to implement policies to ease their suffering. This may appear paradoxical, if not hypocritical, but family support policies are consistent with the historical development of public responsibility for social welfare in each nation. They are strongest in parliamentary governments in which labor movements have achieved a significant voice.³² Lip service to the family, on the other hand, serves as a proxy for the private sphere and as a rationale for abdicating public responsibility for social welfare. Unfortunately, the more individualistic and market-oriented a society becomes, the more difficult it becomes to sustain family bonds.

Let's Bury "the Family"

The decision of the United Nations to proclaim an "International Year of The Family" represents a tacit acknowledgment that family systems are in crisis around the world. This choice of language, however, proclaims an oxymoronic project, because it begs the question of a universally shared definition of the family. Indeed, the UN Committee on the Family that was responsible for organizing the

family year recognized, but tried to evade, this dilemma. First, it prefaced its official set of guiding principles on the family with the claim that "no definition of the family is given because of the great variety of types, cultures, and customs existing in families throughout the world. . . ." Yet, it also issued a report entitled "Family in Crisis," which began by acknowledging that, "to identify crises which beset families today is not feasible without clarifying what we mean by family." Finally, the same document concluded with the astonishing admission that, "we are aware that the family does not exist."³³

The family indeed is dead, if what we mean by it is the modern family *system* in which units comprised of male breadwinner and female homemaker, married couples, and their offspring dominate the land. But its ghost, the ideology of the family, survives to haunt the consciousness of all those who refuse to confront it. It is time to perform a social autopsy on the corpse of the modern family system so that we may try to lay its troublesome spirit to rest. Perhaps, a proper memorial service for the family system we have lost can free us to address the diverse needs of people struggling to sustain intimate relationships under very difficult postmodern family conditions.

Adopting the pathologist's stance of hard-hearted, clinical detachment in this case can lead to an uncomfortable conclusion. Historically, all stable systems of marriage and family life have rested upon diverse measures of coercion and inequality. Family *systems* appear to have been most stable when women and men have been economically interdependent, when households served as units of production with sufficient resources to reproduce themselves, and when individuals lacked alternative means of economic, sexual, and social life. Family units of this sort have always been embedded in, supported, and sanctioned by wider sets of kinship, community, and religious ties. Disturbingly, all such family systems have been patriarchal. The stability of the modern family system, which represented a significant departure from several of these principles, depended upon the adequacy and reliability of the male family wage. However,

the ceaseless development of capitalist industrialization, which disrupted the premodern patriarchal bargain, has now disrupted the modern one as well, and it will continue to disrupt postmodern familial regimes of any sort.

It is sobering to recognize that throughout history, family crises have been resolved by replacing one male-dominant form of domestic life with another. The Chinese revolution, for example, supplanted Confucian patriarchy with patriarchal-socialism.³⁴ In the West, The Family resolved the crisis industrialization had induced in the premodern family economy. The modern family system offered women both gains and losses over the prior patriarchal bargain, but now it too has outlived its historic role.

Patriarchal crises are always moments of intense danger and opportunity. Under postmodern family conditions throughout the postindustrial world, women enjoy greater access to education and employment, and a greater need for both, than ever before. As women become less dependent upon male earnings, they are freer to leave or avoid abusive or hostile relationships. At the same time, however, men seem to feel less obliged to commit themselves to familial or parental responsibilities, and more and more women confront the added burdens of the double day. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the collapse of the communist patriarchal bargain has unleashed a different kind of patriarchal crisis. Although many women have been freed from mandatory second shifts and ration queues, many have also lost their access to employment, abortion, and child care, not to speak of food and life itself. Little wonder that as women struggle to survive diverse patriarchal crises, they too can become nostalgic for the relative security provided by prior, more stable, patriarchal forms.

The Family of Woman

During the late 1950s, just when the modern family system was about to unravel, a humanist book of photographs, *The Family of Man*, enjoyed immense popularity in the U.S.³⁵ The postmodern family

condition that has emerged since then could more aptly be called "the family of woman." Public discourse is preoccupied with the growing ranks of single mothers and fatherless children. The frequently noted feminization of poverty around the globe is a direct product of the feminization of family life that has been taking place since the collapse of the modern industrial order upon which the modern family system depended.

Under conditions of postindustrial, global capitalism, marital instability and woman-centered kin ties are becoming endemic facts of life. This presents postindustrial societies with only two real, and imperfect, options. A nation can choose to recognize and adapt to the new realities, however unwelcome, by assuming greater social responsibility for the welfare of children and citizens, as Scandinavian societies have tried to do; or, societies can resist, deny, and rail against the facts of postmodern family life, resorting to the rhetoric of moral panic and the politics of backlash, so popular in the United States.

Perhaps the postmodern "family of woman" will take the lead in burying The Family at long last. The Family is a concept derived from faulty theoretical premises and an imperialist logic, which even at its height never served the best interests of women, their children, or even of many men. We should not be misled by its false gender neutrality. The International Year of The Family was a year like most years, when women often suffered the brunt of family crises and struggled, against increasingly difficult odds, to sustain their kin and spirits. Women, in particular, should be resisting the forces of denial and the backlash against family change. Attacks against welfare are attacks on mothers struggling to sustain vulnerable families. To resist the campaign for family values is by no means to be anti-family. Instead, women should lead efforts to expand public support for an expanded definition of family, one that is honest and tolerant enough to acknowledge and support the diversity of family patterns, preferences, and relationships in which we actually live. It is time to lay to rest the ghost of The Family so that we may begin to build a safe world for living families. The family is dead. Long live our families!

53. According to Myra Strober, in 1985 42% of households were of this type. "Two-Earner Families," 161. However, Census Bureau data for 1988 report that only 27% of all households included two parents living with children. Quoted in Philip S. Gutis, "What Makes a Family?" B1.
54. Larry Bumpass and Teresa Castro, "Trends in Marital Disruption," 28.

Chapter 2: The Family Is Dead, Long Live Our Families!

1. John Gillis, "Families of Strangers."
2. *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary*.
3. Gillis, 7.
4. O.E.D.
5. Gillis, 6.
6. See, for example, Jacqueline Jones, *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow*. Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter* and Deborah Gray White, *Ar'n't I a Woman?*
7. Deniz Kandiyoti, "Bargaining With Patriarchy," 274-90.
8. See, Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood, 1820-1860," Mary Ryan, *The Empire of the Mother* and Barbara Epstein, *The Politics of Domesticity*.
9. Michael Grossberg, "Who Gets the Child?", 235-60.
10. The classic formulation of this thesis appears in William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*.
11. This perspective is identified with the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure. See, for example, Peter Laslett, *The World We Have Lost*.
12. For example, the Mashpee of Cape Cod, Massachusetts suffered this disruption. See, James Clifford, "Identity in Mashpee." See also, Michael Yellowbird and C. Matthew Snipp, "American Indian Families."
13. James Ferguson, "Migration, mineworkers, and 'the modern family.'"
14. Barbara Ehrenreich, *Fear of Falling*.
15. For the initial argument that the struggle for the male breadwinner wage represented collusion between male workers and bosses, and thus between patriarchy and capitalism, see Heidi Hartmann, "Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex." Jane Humphries challenged this analysis with the claim that working-class wives supported their husbands' class struggle for the family wage, in "The Working-Class Family, Women's Liberation and Class Struggle," 25-41. More recent

- work has refined and complicated this analysis. See, for example, Martha May, "Bread Before Roses."
16. For data and fuller analyses of these processes see, Robert Griswold, *Fatherhood in America*, and Judith Stacey, *Brave New Families*.
 17. Katja Boh, "European Family Life Patterns—A Reappraisal," 280.
 18. Moreover, since 1990 almost twice as many women as men have been added to the paid workforce. "Working Wives Keep America's Families Out of Red," A5.
 19. A 1992 study found that the rate of unwed motherhood among women who had attended at least a year of college rose from 5.5% in 1982 to 11.3% in 1992. The rate for women with professional or managerial jobs, like Murphy Brown, rose from 3.1% to 8.3%. However, in 1993, 47% of families headed by single mothers lived in poverty, compared with 8.3% of two-parent families. Jason DeParle, "Census Reports a Sharp Increase Among Never-Married Mothers," A1, 9.
 20. *The World's Women 1970-1990*.
 21. Two of the most alarmist interpretations of family decline in Sweden are, David Popenoe, *Disturbing the Nest: Family Change and Decline in Modern Society* and Allan Carlson, *The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics*.
 22. Stephen Kinzer, "\$650 a Baby," A1.
 23. In 1988, appx 22% of children lived in single parent families, 47% lived in dual worker families, and 29% lived in male breadwinner, female homemaker families. Griswold, op. cit., 220. However, by 1993, 30% of births in the United States were to unwed mothers. Kristin A. Moore, "Report to Congress on Out-Of-Wedlock Childbearing."
 24. Timothy M. Smeeding, "Why the U.S. Antipoverty System Doesn't Work Very Well."
 25. Same-sex partners who choose to legalize their relationship are entitled to most of the rights and benefits of heterosexual marriage. However, they are not entitled to a church marriage or to adopt children.
 26. For comparative data, see, Smeeding, op. cit; and Irene Wennemo, *Sharing the Costs of Children*.
 27. Gordon, *Pitied But Not Entitled*.
 28. Smeeding, op. cit.
 29. See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Congress Builds a Coffin," 33-36.
 30. See Susan Reinhold, "Through The Parliamentary Looking Glass," 61-78.
 31. Perhaps the best-known essay of the centrist family-values campaign is

- Barbara Defoe Whitehead, "Dan Quayle Was Right." I discuss this campaign in chapters 3 and 4.
32. Harold Wilensky, "Common Problems, Divergent Policies," 1-3.
 33. Quotes were taken from the "Guiding Principles On The Family," and "Family in Crisis."
 34. Judith Stacey, *Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China*.
 35. New York, Museum of Modern Art.

Chapter 3: The Neo-Family Values Campaign

1. Whitehead, "Dan Quayle Was Right," 47-84.
2. Whitehead, "Was Dan Quayle Right?" 13. For sample retreads, see, Charen, "Hey, Murphy, Quayle was right," and Fields, "Murphy's chorus of enlightened celebrities," p. B9.
3. Popenoe, "The Controversial Truth: Two-Parent Families Are Better," Popenoe, "Scholars Should Worry about the Disintegration of the American Family," Beck, "What's good for babies: Both parents."
4. Moynihan, "Defining Deviancy Down," 17-30; Wilson, "The Family-Values Debate," 24-31.
5. Stacey, *Brave New Families*.
6. Fields, "Murphy's Chorus," B9.
7. Popenoe, "Scholars Should Worry," A48. For the statement and list of Council members, see "Family and Child Well-Being: Eight Propositions," 11.
8. Personal interview conducted April 6, 1994, Oakland, California.
9. Quoted in Karen Winkler, "Communitarians Move Their Ideas Outside Academic Arena," A7.
10. Kamarck and Galston, "Putting Children First."
11. Blankenhorn, Elshtain, and Bayme, eds., *Rebuilding the Nest*; National Commission on Children, *Beyond Rhetoric*.
12. Personal interview, April 6, 1994.
13. Whitehead, "A New Familism?" 5.
14. Wilson, "The Family-Values Debate," 31.
15. Klein, "The Out-of-Wedlock Question," 37.
16. Blankenhorn made these remarks during his presentation to "Safe Communities: A Search For Solutions," a 1995 California Public Affairs Forum sponsored by Hitachi, Ltd., which was held at the Sheraton Palace Hotel, San Francisco, September 28, 1995.
17. Quoted in Michael Kranish, "In bully pulpit, preaching values," 17.