

**Announcements:**

- final
  - thursday, 3-5pm.
  - cumulative
  - 1 page handwritten cheat-sheet

**Last time:**

- pseudo polynomial time
- Knapsack PTAS

**Today:**

- online algorithms
- ski renter
- secretary

**Approximation Algorithms**


“show algorithm’s solution is always close to optimal solution”

**Challenge:** for hard problems optimal solution is complex.

**Approach:**

1. relax constraints and solve relaxed optimally.
2. fix violated constraints.
3. show “fixed solution” is close to “relaxed solution”

## Algorithms Flow Chart



## Course Topics

- Dynamic Programming
- Reductions
  - network flow
  - NP hardness
- Approximation Algorithms
  - Greedy algorithms

# Online Algorithms

“algorithms that must make decisions without full knowledge of input”

(e.g., if input is events over time, then algorithm doesn’t know future)

## Ski Renter

input:

- cost to buy skis:  $B$ .
- cost to rent skis:  $R$ .
- daily weather  $d_1, \dots, d_n$  with
 
$$d_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if good weather} \\ 0 & \text{if bad weather} \end{cases}$$
 (let  $k = \sum_i d_i$ )

output: schedule for renting or buying skis.

online constraint: on day  $i$  do not know  $d_{i+1}, \dots, d_n$ .

**Note:** optimality is impossible because don’t know future.

**Idea:** approximate “optimal offline” algorithm

**Algorithm:**  $OPT$  (offline)

- if  $kR < B$ , buy on day 1.
- else, rent on each good day.

Performance:  $OPT = \min(kR, B)$ .

**Def:** an online alg is  $\beta$ -competitive with optimal offline alg,  $OPT$ , if on all inputs  $x$  for  $X$ ,

- minimization:  $Alg(x) \leq \beta OPT(x)$ .

- maximization:  $Alg(x) \geq OPT(x)/\beta$ .

**Challenge:**

- if we buy first day we ski:
  - for  $d = (1, 0, 0, \dots, 0)$
  - $OPT = R$ ;  $Alg = B \gg R$
- if we rent each time we ski
  - for  $d = (1, 1, 1, \dots, 1)$
  - $OPT = B$ ;  $Alg = Rn \gg B$

**Algorithm:** “Rent to Buy” “Rent unless total rental cost would exceed buy cost, then buy”

**Example:**  $R = 1, B = 3$

<b>d</b>	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	...
<b>Alg</b>	R	/	R	R	B	/	0	0	...

$$Alg = \underbrace{3R + B}_{\leq 2B}, OPT = B$$

**Theorem:**  $Alg \leq 2OPT$  (Alg is 2-competitive)

**Proof:**

case 1:  $kR \leq B$

- Alg:  $kR$
- OPT:  $kR$

$$\Rightarrow Alg = OPT \leq 2OPT.$$

case 2:  $kR > B$

- Alg: total rental +  $B \leq 2B$
- OPT:  $B$

$$\Rightarrow Alg \leq 2OPT.$$

**Note:** competitive analysis gives very strong approximation result.

# Secretary Problem

input:

- sequence of candidates  $1, \dots, n$ .
- ordering on candidate qualities.

output:

- “hire” / “no hire” decisions.
- to hire best candidate.

online constraint: must make hire/no hire decision for  $i$  before seeing  $i + 1, \dots, n$ .

**Fact:** “optimal offline” always hires best secretary.

**Claim:** no deterministic algorithm approximates optimal offline.

**Proof:** two candidates

case 1: Alg hires 1

- 2 is better.

case 2: Alg doesn't hire 1

- 1 is better.

**Idea:** consider randomized algorithms.

(maximize probability of hiring the best candidate.)

**Claim:** randomized algorithm is  $n$ -competitive offline.

**Proof:**

- Alg: for all  $i$ , pick  $i$ th secretary with probability  $1/n$ .
- Alg is right with probability  $1/n$
- OPT is always right.

$\Rightarrow n$ -competitive.

**Claim:** no algorithm hires best candidate with probability  $\Omega(1/n)$ .

**Idea:** consider randomized inputs.

**Assumption:** candidates arrive in a uniformly random order.

**Example:**  $n = 3$

1 2 3	1 3 2	3 1 2	2 1 3	2 3 1	3 2 1
(a)	(a)	(b)	(b)	(b)	

Two algs for example:

(a) take  $i$  candidate for some  $i$

$\Rightarrow \Pr[\text{success}] = 1/3$

(b) look at 1st, condition choice of 2nd or 3rd.

- if 2nd better than 1st, hire 2nd
- else, hire 3rd.

$\Rightarrow \Pr[\text{success}] = 1/2$

**Algorithm:** Secretary Alg

- interview  $k$  candidates but make no offers
- hire next secretary that is better than any of first  $k$ .

**Lemma:** For  $k = n/2$  alg is 4-competitive.

**Proof:**

- hire best when 2nd best in first half and 1st best in second half.
- Recall:  $\Pr[A \& B] = \Pr[A \mid B] \Pr[B]$ .
- $\Pr[2\text{nd best in first half}] = 1/2$
- $\Pr[1\text{st best in second half} \mid 2\text{nd best in first half}] = \frac{n/2}{n-1} \geq 1/2$

$$\Rightarrow \Pr[\text{hire best}] \geq \frac{\Pr[2\text{nd in } 1\text{st } 1/2] \Pr[1\text{st in } 2\text{nd } 1/2 \mid 2\text{nd in } 1\text{st } 1/2]}{1/4} \geq$$

**Question:** what is best  $k$ ?

**Theorem:** for  $k = 1/e$  alg is  $e$ -competitive  
and this is best possible.